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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dana Lydell Smith appeals from the district court's order denying his fifth
motion for a new trial. On appeal he challenges only the district court's denial of
his request for counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Smith was charged and convicted of grand theft after a trial.

State v.

Smith, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 467, Docket Nos. 35216 & 35604 (Idaho
App., May 20, 2009). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Smith's judgment of
conviction in an opinion issued May 20, 2009.

!fl

Smith filed for post-conviction

relief, but his petition was dismissed. Smith v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion
No. 699, Docket No. 37819 (Idaho App., November 14, 2011 ). The dismissal
was affirmed on appeal.

!fl

"On September 3, 2010, Smith filed a motion for a Faretta hearing,
requesting a competency hearing to determine if he could proceed on the
criminal case by representing himself."

State v. Smith, 2011 Unpublished

Opinion No. 715, Docket No. 38197, p. 2 (Idaho App., November 21, 2011). "On
September 14, 2010, Smith also filed a motion to alter or amend a judgment .... "

!fl

The district court's denial of these motions was affirmed by the Idaho Court of

Appeals.

!fl

"On January 19, 2012, Smith filed a pro se motion for a new trial on the
State v. Smith, 2013 Opinion No. 19,

basis of newly discovered evidence."

Docket No. 39704, p. 1 (Idaho App., March 28, 2013).
1

"Smith's motion was

based on an assertion that he was mentally incompetent when he was tried for
grand theft and that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a
competency evaluation."

~

at p. 1 n. 1. This motion was properly denied as it

was brought more than two years after final judgment, and therefore it was
untimely and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

~

at pp. 2-3.

On March 11, 2013, Smith filed the current motion for a new trial. (R., pp.
6-7.) The ground for the instant motion was "the district court's failure to hold a
psychiatric examination based on the questions raised by previous evaluations."
(R., p. 6. 1) Smith contended he was entitled to such an evaluation because his

"psychiatric witness was excluded and his testimony, statute requires that the
court order sua sponte another evaluation."

(Id.)

Smith also contended the

failure to order an evaluation "tolled" the "statutory time limit" to file his motion.
(Id.; see also R., pp. 8-14.) The relief he requested was to "immediately order a
psychiatric evaluation and immediately set aside the conviction."

(R., p. 7.)

Smith also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Augmentation.)
The district court ordered briefing on the issue of its jurisdiction to consider
the new motion for a new trial. (Order Re Motion for New Trial (Augmentation).)
Both Smith and the state filed briefing in response to the court's order.
(Augmentation.) Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court denied
both the motion for a new trial and the motion for appointment of counsel. (R.,
pp. 49-50.) Smith filed a timely notice of appeal from the order. (R., pp. 52-55.)

Punctuation, capitalization, and spelling have been altered in quotes from
Smith's pleadings.
1
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ISSUE
Smith states the issue on appeal as:
Did the court err in denying Mr. Smith's motion for
appointment of counsel in light of the non-frivolous constitutional
tolling argument made by him?
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Smith failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying Smith's motion to appoint counsel to represent him on his untimely new
trial motion?

3

ARGUMENT
Smith Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Smith's Request For Counsel To Represent Him On His Untimely New
Trial Motion
A.

Introduction
Smith contends the district court erred in denying him counsel because he

asserted a viable claim that the limitation period should have been tolled because
he has a mental disease and was taking prescribed psychotropic medication.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) Review of the record shows no basis for a claim that
Smith was incompetent to pursue his right to access the court during the four
years at issue.

Smith's motion for a new trial was therefore not timely, and

pursuing it would have been frivolous.

Because the motion was frivolous, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request for counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) is "within the

court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims
presented are frivolous."

Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d

1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

Smith Presented No Evidence And No Allegation That He Was Incapable
Of Pursuing His Rights In Court During The Four Years Between The
Remittitur And The Filing Of The Instant Motion
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel in "post-conviction

or post-commitment proceedings" unless the court determines that the
proceeding is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means

4

would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous
proceeding."

I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). 2

The district court determined that Smith's

motion for new trial was a frivolous proceeding because the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider it. (R., pp. 49-50.) This determination is supported by the
law and the record.
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714
(2003).

"A motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered

evidence may be made only before or within two (2) years after final judgment."
I.C.R. 34. 3 The Idaho Court of Appeals entered its remittitur in the appeal from
the judgment in this case on June 17, 2009, and thus the judgment became final
on that date.

Smith, 2013 Opinion No. 19, at p. 2.

Rule 34 extended the

jurisdiction of the court to consider a motion for a new trial based on a claim of
newly discovered evidence for two years, to June 17, 2011.

Smith filed the

motion at issue on March 11, 2013 (R., p. 6), almost four years after the
judgment became final. The district court lacked jurisdiction because the motion

Idaho Code section 19-852 was amended and its subsection renumbered
effective July 1, 2013. The language relevant to this case is the same but now
appears at I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). The numbering in place at the time of the district
court's order is used in this brief.
3 Smith's claim he was incompetent at trial cannot reasonably be framed as being
based on newly discovered evidence. (R., pp. 6-7.) Nevertheless, because the
district court applied the two-year limitation period without addressing whether it
was actually applicable, the state will address the motion as if it were based on
newly discovered evidence.
2

5

was filed well beyond the time the court's jurisdiction to consider the motion
expired.
Smith contends he asserted a viable issue as to whether he was
incompetent, and thus the period to file the new trial motion was tolled, which
issue required appointment of counsel.

He argues that the tolling standard

applicable to actions under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedures Act
("UPCPA") should apply to new trial motions.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.)

Assuming the applicability of this standard, Smith has failed to show that he
presented a non-frivolous claim that he was incapable of timely filing his motion
for a new trial due to mental illness.
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows
that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time."
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable
tolling theories in the context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v.
State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
"extraordinary circumstances" and acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for
post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the
one-year limitation period of I. C. § 19-4902 may be tolled if an applicant is
prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to courts, from
earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho
957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788,
791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). "A petitioner's due process right is not
violated by a statute of limitation bar unless he can show such an inability to file a
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timely petition that he was denied any meaningful opportunity to present his postconviction claims." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct.
App. 2011 ).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained what a petitioner must show to
prevail on a claim that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present claims
due to mental illness, such that the limitation period tolls:
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA
to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to
bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable
of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Equitable tolling will
apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness
actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any
period following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet
the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the limitation period.
Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140.
Although Smith presented a claim he was incompetent at trial, he
specifically asserted that he was suffering from the same incompetency at the
time of his current motion.

(Memorandum of Law in Support of Response to

Court Orders, at pp. 3-4 (Augmentation).) According to Smith, his current claim
is the same incompetency claim he has been asserting since 2007. (Id., at pp. 12.) It is based on a mental illness he claims he has had since he was eight. (Id.
at p. 5.) Furthermore, the record establishes that Smith was able to pursue an
action in post-conviction and no less than three prior post-commitment motions
(two of which were also based on claims of incompetency), all after the judgment
in the criminal case became final.
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There is no evidence in the record that Smith was not capable of pursuing
his legal interests in the four years between the finality of the judgment and the
filing of the current motion. He in fact filed a post-conviction petition and several
motions in the criminal case. He asserts that he has had effectively the same
mental illness (and same level of competence) for many years. Because there is
no evidence or allegation that Smith was less competent in the four years
preceding the filing of the current motion than he was at the time he filed it, any
claim that Smith was prevented from filing his motion due to incapacity to
meaningfully take advantage of his rights is frivolous. The district court therefore
did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith's request for counsel.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order denying
appointment of counsel to represent Smith on his untimely motion for a new trial.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of September, 2013, I caused
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